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Abstract All complex designs emerge as the result of the decisions made by the design engineers. It can be shown that the designs are best when the preferences guiding the engineering decisions align with the overall system or corporate preference. But we know that all people make decisions based on their own personal preferences, which are unlikely to align well with the corporate preference. This research addresses the question, what mechanisms can be used to better align engineers’ decisions to the system or corporate preference, but particularly such that major catastrophes might be prevented? Inspiration for this work comes from a number of very substantial losses that likely would have been prevented by the systems engineers had they the incentive to come forth with knowledge they certainly had. Examples include Boeing’s experience with the 737MAX, which appears to be costing Boeing more than $100 billion, and Volkswagen’s experience with the falsified emission testing of their diesel-engine vehicles, which resulted in over 31 billion euros in fines, penalties and other direct costs. We believe that incentive mechanisms could have been in place that would have prevented these very significant losses. Thus, we believe that there exist potential mechanisms that would benefit both the corporation and the engineers. We further believe that these mechanisms would not only improve corporate profitability but they have the potential to save many lives as well.